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THE NATURAL LAW AND THE RIGHT
TO PROPERTY *
I stand in need of liberty myself, and I wish every crea-
ture of God may enjoy it equally with myself.-Priestley.
Men are not corrupted by the exercise of power or de-
based by the habit of obedience; but by the exercise of a
power which they believe to be illegitimate, and by obedience
to a rule which they consider to be usurped and oppressive.
-DeTocqueville.
In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place, oblige it to control itself.-Madison.
The principal innovation . . . instead of moral values
nothing but naturalistic values. Naturalization of morality.
In the place of sociology a doctrine of the forms of dominion.
-Nietzsche.
Before the final trumpet sounds and I enter the lists to
maintain here against all comers the natural law right to
acquire and hold private property and the civil or municipal
law right not to be deprived of it except by due process of
law, let me make some plain avowals and do some prelimi-
nary tilting.
First, I do not require anyone to admit that this right
whose devoir I do is "the best [natural right] that God
ever made or will make." I
Second, I shall be satisfied with these admissions: that it
is a very important natural right; that the founding fathers
and those who came after them profoundly believed that its
recognition and just preservation were prime essentials to
the pursuit of happiness here; and that, except for the Euro-
*This article originally was an address delivered December 8, 1950, at the
Fourth Annual Natural Law Institute at the University of Notre Dame,
1 "It is not enough for the knight of romance that you agree that his lady
is a very nice girl-if you do not admit that she is the bet that God ever made
or will make, you must fight." Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. Ray. 40 (1918).
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pean minded radicals and their fellow travelers, witting and
unwitting, the American people as a whole still hold to and
act on that belief.
Third, I am a true believer in the moral law as the basis
not only of the right to property but of all our natural rights,
and am bound to concede that the right of the positivists,
pragmatists, and materialists among us to hold to and pro-
fess a contrary belief is itself a natural right of no mean pro-
portions; and that so long as their belief is honestly enter-
tained and civilly and honestly put forward, I can justly
make nothing of it but a good clean fight.
Fourth, I must make it clear that in plumping for the nat-
ural law right to acquire and own private property, I do not
put it forward as an absolute and unqualifiable municipal or
civil law right. I do, though, insist that just governments
are formed not to destroy but to protect and expand this
natural right as well as the others, and I do emphatically
deny the moral right of any government to abrogate, deal
inconsistently with, or unjustly abridge it. Further, I rec-
ognize that in any society, the slightest removed from a
state of nature, the adequate and proper securement and en-
joyment of natural right, particularly the right to private
property, requires concreting into positive law. I, therefore,
agree that a just government operating on natural law prin-
ciples may, and should, in exchange for the security its laws
afford the right,' properly and justly impose upon the exer-
cise of it, restrictions and conditions not inconsistent with
its basic principle.
Fifth, jealous of my reputation for at least ordinary intel-
ligence and firmness of character, let me, by clearly stating
why I came here, rebut the presumptions against both aris-
ing from my presence.
2 "That which in the natural state was a mere invisible thread, in the social
state becomes a cable." Jeremy Benthem, as quoted in HuTcBEsoN, LAW AS
LiaaAToR 181 (1937).
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When Dean Manion, singling me out as the particular
target for the scoffs and gibes, the slings and arrows of the
sophisticated positivists, the skeptical pragmatists, the creep-
ing socialists, the social planners I of all shades, dubbed me
"knight of Property," he did not soft soap or Tom Sawyer
me into whitewashing this fence of his. He merely raised
his Macedonian cry, "Come over and help us," and, like
minded with him, touching the natural law in general and
the natural rights of men, particularly as they have been
recognized, protected, and preserved in our constitutions,
federal and state, I have girded my loins, put on my armor
of proof, and come this long way to do so.
I know as well as he does that the days of the happy and
peaceful wanderings through the pleasant fields of academic
speculation about, and historical discussion of, natural law
as the higher moral law, the universal source of all just posi-
tive law, which has characterized the first three sessions here,
are over, and that the time has now come to begin the fight
in earnest.4
Now that this Institute is leaving off talking about natural
law, as an academic abstraction, to get down to cases by
talking about natural rights as realities, about, in short,
words become flesh and dwelling among us, from here on
out it will have to be every man for himself and the devil
take the hindmost, but I am not afraid.
3 These consider government and society, and the relations of man to man,
only from the point of view of so-called economic democracy and a planned
economy. It is their view that prices and wages and a wider, indeed a redistri-
bution of economic goods, is to be the chief end of government, and all other,
especially all older value judgments, are to be discarded. With these, hand in
hand with the diminishing emphasis on moral and spiritual values, and on po-
litical and civil liberty, and the constitutional way of life here, there goes a
tremendously increasing consciousness of and emphasis on government and gov-
ernors.
4 In FuLLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITsELF 100-1 (1940), the author, of
whose effective championship of natural law I make grateful acknowledgment,
carefully disclaims championship of the "doctrine of natural [and inalienable]
rights," and of the faith and works of the Founders. Indeed, as to them, he
comes close to taking to his verbal heels.
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For am I not a Scotch Irish Presbyterian, born in the
Bible Belt in original sin, but by the Grace of God a brand
snatched from the burning? Was I not nurtured on the
strong meat of the Old Testament and the shorter cate-
chism, and in the belief that "There is a spirit in man
and the breath of the Almighty giveth him understand-
ing"? ' Was I not moreover raised in the tough belief that
"What must be, will be," and that the children of light may,
indeed must, answer duty's call in the sublime confidence
that human *fortitude will always equal human adversity?
Besides, though in a short spell of teaching at Northwest-
ern I did once experience a temporary metempsychosis with
the spirit of the judge moving out, the spirit of the teacher
moving in,6 I am not a law teacher. I am, and proud of it,
a judge, one of those naive, simple-minded jurists I "who
possess ideas of honor, patriotism, and rights," and "find
their strongest defense of these ideas in terms of some irrefu-
table, natural world to which the ideas correspond." 8
Until now the men of little or no faith, pragmatists and
positivists, the creeping socialists, the leaping-now men,9
have paid the project and the goings on here little mind.
Particularly has this been true of those politically minded
pragmatists 10 and positivists, who, posing as disinterested
5 Job, 32:8.
6 Hutcheson, The Worm Turns, or a Judge Tries Teaching, 27 ILL. L. REv.
355 (1932).
7 "Occasionally we do find a jurist who resents the unfavorable compari-
son of jurisprudence to natural science and who is inclined to charge the critics
of the law either with simple ignorance of legal learning or else with some sin-
ister purpose to undermine respect for law. Such jurists believe that the mean-
ing of the Constitution stands like the Rock of Ages. Unscrupulous men may
ignore its strict apportionment of rights and duties; ignorant men may never
reach an understanding of its beneficient provisions. There it stands, a proper
object for study and veneration, but never an instrument to be used according
to the needs of the times." ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS 9-10 (1935).
8 Id. at 309.
9 These claim that nothing matters now but the new; that a backward
look is regressive and destructive; that modernism, especially the conception
they hold of it, is all that counts.
10 John R. Commons, in his description of Administration, thus points this
out: "On the one side it is 'the pragmatic philosophy' of present day social sci-
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factual observers of the passing scene, chroniclers of the
"pure fact of law" seem really plugging for a naturalistic
jurisprudence,1 with courts and judges discredited and their
independence destroyed,' 2 a planned economy and govern-
ment unlimited in the saddle.
Nearly one hundred years ago Amiel wrote in his Journal
Intime: 1'
Every despotism has a specially keen and hostile instinct
for what ever keeps up human dignity and independence. It
is curious to see scientific and realist teaching used everywhere
as a means o,' stifling all freedom of investigation as addressed
to moral questions under a dead weight of facts. Materialism
is the auxiliary doctrine of every tyranny, whether of the one
or of the masses. To crush what is spiritual, moral, human-
so to speak-in man by specializing him; to form mere wheels
of the great social machine instead of perfect individuals; to
make society and not conscience the centre of life, to enslave
the soul to things to de-personalize man-this is the dominant
drift of our epoch. [Emphasis supplied.]
Scornful they undoubtedly have been of the simple go-
ings on here. From the lofty perch of their skeptical sophis-
tication,'4 the legal positivists who claim to see only "the
pure fact of law," existing completely independent of, in-
ences. . . . It is not mere coincidence that twentieth century philosophies began
to call themselves 'pragmatic'-not the individualistic pragmatism of William
James, but the social pragmatism of John Dewey [See DEWEY, Looic oF IN-
QuIRY (1938)1." Commons, Twentieth Century Economics, JOURNAL or SocIA.
PHILOSOPHY 32 (1939). "On the other side it is the problem of collective ac-
tion in control of individual action. Collective action, with its working rules,
takes the place of the divine law and natural law that descended from John
Locke and the eighteenth century philosophies." Id. at 38. Cf. Otto, The Social
Philosophy of John Dewey, 5 JoUaNAL oF SociAL P iiLosorpn 42-60 (1939).
11 See ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935).
12 Hutcheson, Book Review, 3 LAWYERS GUILD REV. 58 (Nov.-Dec. 1943);
HuTcaEsoN, NEW INSTRUMENTS or PuBLic POWER (unpublished lecture to the
California State Bar, 1946).
13 1 AmIEL, JOURNAL INrrIa 58-9 (Ward transl. 1923).
14 ". . . the restraints which positivism at present imposes on legal thinking,
and which prevent us from following this natural method, take the form not so
much of specific beliefs as of emotional attitudes. Today it is still positivism
which is the sophisticated view. It alone has 'brave true things to say.' It alone
has purified its truths by a thorough washing in cynical acid." FULLER, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 104. Cf. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOs OF GOVEaNMENT (1935), and
ARNOLD, THE FoLxLoRE OF CAPITALISM (1937).
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deed, entirely apart from moral 11 ideas and principles, have
no doubt looked down their noses at what they regard as this
twaddle about natural law.16 They have not, though, felt
called upon to come in swinging. Ostentatiously ignoring
the so-called poor bumblers who have been babbling here
about natural law, the pragmatists, 17 particularly the fellow
traveling Pharisees among them, have gone on making broad
their phylacteries and enlarging the borders of their gar-
ments. Paying tithe of mint, anise and cumin, and making a
religion of cynicism, skepticism and unfaith in general, they
have omitted the weightier matters of the law, Judgment,
Mercy and Faith.
As for me, I will be found no dissembler, sailing under
false colors. Like the man called Hi, "I inform you before
we embark. You may charge me with murder or want of
sense. We are all of us weak at times. But the slightest ap-
proach to a false pretense was never among my crimes." 18
I confess that I am, and proud of it, not a New Dealer but a
Jeffersonian, Lincolnian, American, one of those "solemn
men" whom the pragmatists, the scientists, the skeptical de-
votees of facts, 9 so deprecate, "who go about the world
15 "Just what are the positivists trying to do? We know, of course, that
they seek some means of drawing a sharp line between law and morality, be-
tween the law tlat is, on the one hand, the law that ought to be, or is trying
to be, on the other. We know also that the positivists since Hobbes have almost
without exception denied that they were drawing this line for ethical or political
reasons." Fu~mx, op. cit. supra note 4, at 84.
16 Cf. ROBINsoN, LAw AND THE LAWYERS 269-75 (1935).
17 Said one of them, in a revealing moment when, the cards all stacked
and marked to suit him, the dealer was shuffling, cutting, dealing and calling the
cards to bring about the revolution he and his followers were proclaiming: "Since
the advent of the Roosevelt administration we have had the language of prag-
matism embodied in messages to the Congress and in political speeches ...
Critics of the New Deal are likely to claim that this pragmatic way of talking
is only an excuse for the adoption of fundamentally unsound but politically ex-
pedient policies." ROBiNsoN, LAW .Nm =n LAwYERs 275-5 (1935).
18 LEwEs CARROLL, FIr FouRTH, THE HuNTmnG Or THE SNARK (1891).
19 "Throughout Europe and America men are becoming increasingly con-
scious of the inadequacy of prevailing social philosophy as a guide to the practical
problems of social control. Karl Marx and Jeremy Bentham saw long ago that
such control would ultimately have to rely upon the sense of fact that dominates
natural science." ROBaSoN, LAW AND THE LAwYERs 22-3 (1935).
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preaching that there is something more to be relied upon
than facts. . .,, 20 But I am not cast down by this depre-
cation, for I believe on the authority of men a little more
scientific than, at least as learned as, these; that ". . facts
are sterile until there are minds capable of choosing between
them,... minds which under the bare fact see the soul of the
fact"; 21 that ". . . a fact is nothing except in relation to de-
sire ..."; 22 and that "There is in the human intellect a pow-
er of expansion, I might almost call it a power of creation,
which is brought into play by the simple brooding upon
facts." 23
I confess, too, that I am not ashamed to call myself a pa-
triot,24 a moral being who believes in honor, piety, and the
other moral virtues, a jurist who believes in constitutional
rights and the justice which recognizes and protects them,
in short a plain and simple man who believes in the good
life and that there is more to living than mere bodily health.
Compare and contrast with this simple profession of faith
in moral values this questioning: 25
But it is fair to ask how much the world has gained by the
insistence upon these moral qualities like piety, justice, patri-
otism, which have an existence and glory over and above that
of physical health and a sound serene mind .... One some-
times wonders whether we should not be better off one hun-
dred or five hundred years from now if we could set out with
the simple objective of a maximum of bodily health for the
population of the world.
God forbid, I say.
20 Id. at 17.
21 Henri Poincare, as quoted in HUTcHESON, JUDGmENT INTUITIVE 23 (1938).
22 Will Durant, as quoted id. at 26.
23 Tyndall, as quoted id. at 25.
24 "Jefferson was a typical representative of the liberal and humanitarian
nationalism of the eighteenth century. He was a patriot: 'The first object of my
heart is my own country. In that is embarked my family, my fortune, and my
own existence. .. .'
"His patriotism was devoid of any narrowness or exclusiveness. The same
strict moral laws which governed the conduct of individuals were valid for the
life of nations." KOHN, THE IDEA OP NATIONALISm 308-9 (1944).
25 ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS 17-8 (1935).
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Compare, too, this downright repudiation of, and unfaith
in moral values, this pattern and prototype of modern ma-
terialism, pragmatism and naturalistic jurisprudence so
called:26
... for Nietzsche believed that not only was the Christian God
dead, but also the rational moral values, which he regarded
as a secularized Christianity. He outlined his program in
sharp words. "The principal innovation ... instead of moral
values nothing but naturalistic values. Naturalization of mo-
rality. In the place of sociology a doctrine of the forms of
dominion."
But, so convinced am I that the future of civilization
and of liberty lies not with the materialists, the collectivists,
the pragmatists, the naturalists, the men of unfaith, but with
the natural law men, the men of faith, that, crying, "Lord,
I believe, help Thou mine unbelief." 27 I have come here to
stand up with the men of faith and be counted as one. So
standing, I affirm and reaffirm my faith in natural law and in
the natural rights of men; faith that the state is created for
the individual and not the individual for the state; faith in
human dignity and in man as a collaborator with his God;
faith in human destiny; faith that in preserving the prin-
ciple of this Government from corruption lies the last best
hope for the preservation of that dignity, the realization of
that destiny; faith, in short, that when this Government was
formed,2"
. . . Something fundamentally new and of immense import-
ance had happened. For the first time a nation had arisen
on the basis of these truths held "to be self evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among those are
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness"--truths which
the nation could not give up without destroying its own foun-
dation.
And now, having, by these preliminary tiltings and lay-
ing about me, cleared the way, I come to my precise part in
26 KoHN, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 48 (1949).
27 Mark, 9:24.
28 KoHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALism 291 (1944).
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this tourney. This is to prove on my body what I came
here to maintain, that the right to acquire and own pri-
vate property, secured and protected in and by our con-
stitutional form, though it is now a right by positive law,
is also, and primarily, a natural right having its origin and
basis in natural law, and that, as such it may not justly be
abrogated, unreasonably abridged, or inconsistently dealt
with by positive law.
In doing this, I shall not seek to define natural law, dis-
cuss its sources, review its changeless, though changing,
history and content through the ages, 9 or deal with it in
general except in the briefest kind of way. All this has been
excellently done in the Institutes and lectures which have
preceded this paper.
Neither shall I undertake to catalogue and classify the
sources and variations, the grades and shades of positivism,
to compare them with natural law theories. This has been
done with complete thoroughness, great clarity and fine
feeling by Fuller in his admirable book, The Law in Search
of Itself, on which, in the notes I have gratefully drawn.
Finally, though the temptation to do so is great, I shall
not call the roll of the positivists and pragmatists, be-
ginning with forthright, honest old Thomas Hobbes, and
ending with the not so forthright and honest Adolph Hitler
and Joe Stalin, to match them man for man with the nat-
ural law men of history, and to debit and credit the ledger of
each with his services and disservices to human dignity
and human destiny.
Of the natural law in general, it is sufficient to say
that I believe with Cicero that it is the principle which
lies behind all the order of the world, the universal, the
ultimate, principle behind all positive law, the ground-
work, the firm foundation, upon which the structures of
29 See Chapter VI, "Law as Purpose, and the Will to Ever Juster Laws-The
Principle of Social Peace" in HUvCHEON, LAW AS LIBERATOR (1937).
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human society rest. It is the principle of that justice, the
search for which is the bond of men in states, the end of
government, the end of civil society, that justice which
has ever been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained
or until liberty is lost in the pursuit.
Stammler, in his Theory of Justice, declares that ideal
justice, justice in the abstract, the constant, and perpetual
disposition to render to every man his due, is and always
has been the same, yesterday, today and forever; that,
though in its manifestations through formal law in different
countries, under different climates and conditions, and at
different times, it has appeared to be different, this is only
appearance; that what has in each instance appeared is
not justice itself but merely the result of fallible human
efforts under the pressure of natural law with a changing
content to express it in positive law. He maintains, in short,
that justice in its purest form as an aspiration is timeless
and universal; 30 that at any place, at any time, justice as
an ideal is, and always must be, the same. He concludes,
and I agree, that justice is perhaps the purest and most
binding concept men have ever entertained; that at no time
or place, no matter how long or dark the night has seemed,
has man been entirely free of its authority; and that "who-
ever maintains and defends a specific legal rule with de-
finite content as absolute, simply because it is legal, is
guilty of an objectively unjust act of will."
The Right to Property
. . . the corruption of any government generally begins
with the corruption of its principle, and the duration of any
given form depends upon the persistence in a given society of
the particular principle which is characteristic of that form.-
Montesquieu.
It is certain that the right of property is the most sacred
of all the rights of citizenship, and even more important, in
some respects, than liberty itself. . . . -Rousseau.
30 Ibid.
31 STAinmER, TnE TEORY OP JUSTICE 26 (1925).
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Men cannot, surely, be said to give up their natural rights
by entering into a compact for the better securing of them....
-Priestly.
Having come now by easy stages to the very nub
of my subject, the natural right to property, I shall deal
with it in the same cautious and leisurely way.
First, I will admit that in the very nature of things,
it is impossible to conceive of municipal or civil law, law
in the concrete, without accepting so much of the posi-
tivist philosophy as considers law to be a definite rule laid
down by the sovereign which the subject must obey. I will
admit, too, that unless and until set down in municipal
or civil law, the natural right to property and the other
natural rights, except as individuals or groups have the
requisite force to maintain them, have no binding force,
no compulsive sanction behind them except in the moral
sphere;32 and that human nature being what it is, for the
effective enjoyment of these rights, the compulsive force
of municipal or positive law is greatly needed.
I refuse, though, to admit their claimed corollary that
the theory of natural rights is a delusion and snare; that
the history of man's struggles for liberty in that name is
now just an old wives' tale; and that in claiming that we
believe in the existence of natural rights and in the eternal
verity of man's struggles to secure and preserve them, we
natural law men are ignorantly or knowingly dealing in
moonshine and roses.
32 In an early Texas case, Melinger v. City of Houston, 68 TEx. 37, 3 S. W.
249, 253 (1887), there is a very interesting discussion of this point. Said the
court: "A right has been well defined to be a well-founded claim, and a well-
founded claim means nothing more or less than a claim recognized or secured by
law.
"Rights which pertain to persons, other than such as are termed natural rights,
are essentially the creatures of municipal law, written or unwritten; and it must
necessarily be held that a right, in a legal sense, exists, when, in consequence of
the existence of given facts, the law declares that one person is entitled to enforce
against another a given claim, or to resist the enforcement of a claim urged by
another."
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With due and becoming deference and humility in pre-
suming, to differ with the positivists, these naturalistic
jurisprudents, these "pure fact of law" men, I make bold
to say that I think the shoe is on the other foot. Indeed, I
think that in refusing to recognize, as we do, both natural
and positive law rights, both morals and law, it is the prag-
matists and not we who are the self-deceived moon gazers.
It is they who are mainly responsible for the prevailing
confusion of thought which permits some to propound as
necessary and irrepressible a conflict here between human
rights and property rights.
John Austin, the patron saint of the moderate posi-
tivists, began the law's descent to the Avernus of unfaith
by proposing to distinguish morals from law. Some of the
modem but less moderate pragmatists have continued it
by proposing to divorce morals from law, while the down-
right radicals among them, including the fellow travelers,
preferring headlong descent, propose, as Nietzsche did, to
abolish morals altogether.
When we natural law men speak of rights, including
the right to acquire and own property as natural and un-
alienable, we speak of them as they were in man's natural
state. We do not speak of them as they are set down and
secured in the municipal law of government organized as
ours is on natural law principles and subject to constitu-
tional limitations, the law which is at once the will and
consent of the people. We freely recognize the right, in-
deed the duty, of such a government, to affix conditions to
the exercise of natural rights consistent with the declared
aims and ends of the society. We recognize its right, too,
within constitutional limits, to impose upon the enjoyment
and exercise of it, restrictions not inconsistent with the basic
right. But this recognition is not at all inconsistent with
the belief in natural law rights, or in the bedrock premises
and arguments on which that belief rests. These premises are
that life, liberty, and property, and the natural right to them
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does not exist because men have made laws. On the con-
trary, laws exist because life, liberty, and property, and
the right to them existed before there were laws, and because
men formed themselves into social orders and set up govern-
ments in order to make laws wherewith the better to pre-
serve and protect these rights.
Further, it must be admitted by all that before any
social order was formed or any laws made, no man had a
natural, a moral, right to deprive another of his life, his
liberty, or his property. It must be admitted, too, that in the
event of attack, upon them, each individual had a moral
right derived not from positive, but from natural law, and
inherent in him as a moral being, to defend his person, his
liberty, and his property to the full extent of his force and
power.
While, therefore, any political society that men form
has the right, indeed the duty, to organize and support by
law a common force to protect constantly and enhance the
enjoyment of those rights which its members have by their
very nature and which they formed the society to preserve
and protect, no society can justly use that common force
against an individual or a group to deprive him or them of
any of those rights for which the society was organized .to
maintain.
Such a perversion of force would be equally contrary to
our premise if used by an individual or by the organized
society. Force has been given to us as individuals to defend
our individual rights, and no one can justly say that this
force when aggregated into the common force may be used
by us as members of society to destroy or unjustly abridge
or impair the equal rights of any of our brothers.
To restate: no individual acting separately can mor-
ally or lawfully use force to infringe upon or destroy the
natural rights of others. The common force is nothing more
than the organized combination of the individual forces. It
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logically follows, therefore, that it may not be so used;
and that if it is, individuals have the natural right to re-
sist that force to the extent, if need be, of throwing off the
government altogether and setting up a new and just gov-
ernment in its place.
Nothing, then, can be more evident than that, in any
given society organized on just principles, positive law is
the collective organization of the natural and individual
right to the lawful defense of individual rights. Substituting
common force for the individual forces, it authorizes it to
do what the individual forces have a natural and lawful
right to do. It preserves and protects the rights of indi-
viduals in their persons, their liberties, and their proper-
ties. It maintains the right of each and causes justice to
reign over all. 3
It is on this simple but completely sound conception of
natural rights, including the right to acquire and own prop-
erty, that I here take my stand. It was on this bedrock con-
ception that the seventeenth and eighteenth century phil-
osophers, when they dreamed of human liberty, of a new
heaven and a new earth, raised their political and philo-
sophical edifices toward heaven to make their dreams come
true. It was on this bedrock conception that the founding
fathers based their claims to natural rights and their ideas
of a governmental form which would secure and advance
them. It was on the solid basis of this conception that,
with dynamic and shattering force, the politico-legal ideas
of the natural law and the rights of man, of law as liber-
ator, of the dignity and greatness of the individual human
soul, and of man as a collaborator in Human Destiny with
his God, came to dominate the political thinking and ac-
tion, indeed the life of a great part of the western world.
Our ancestors, " ... men who possessed ideas of honor,
patriotism, and rights . .. ," those moral qualities which
33 Cf. BASTiAT, TnE LAW 1-9 (1950).
34 RoBINsON, LAW-AND TuE LAWYERS 309 (1935).
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our fact-devoted pragmatists so scorn, staked their fortunes
and their lives on the eternal verities of the natural or moral
law, the natural or moral rights which just governments are
created to preserve and, therefore, may not abrogate or un-
justly impair.
The very nature and origin, the very genius of their
laws, had taught them, as Englishmen, that laws came up
from the people, not down from the prince. They had
taught them, too, that laws were based on the ideals, and
flowered from the customs and needs of the people when
these were strong enough to become articulated into law,
and that laws should change when the times required. Laws
with them were made for men, not men for laws. Oceana,
not Leviathan, was their model. Harrington, not Hobbes,
their preceptor. Lex was rex with them, not rex, lex.
Nurtured on the common law, the notion of the civil
law that law is the command of the prince which the people
have no part in making and yet must unquestioningly obey,
had never been a welcome familiar with them, and if it had
been, had they not thrown off the prince for the people? The
history of England and of America had taught them to de-
mand their rights and liberties, not as new rights and lib-
erties, but as confirming those which had, or should have
been, theirs immemorially.
For centuries it had been the English habit of mind to
go from liberty to liberty, as though these liberties had al-
ways been theirs. The Anglo-Americans of the Revolu-
tionary period were, too, the full heirs of the complete and
final overthrow in England of authoritarianism as a dogma,
and of the triumph there of the ideas of the natural law,
of just law as supreme ruler, and of consent and will as the
fundamental basis of just law. They, therefore, found them-
selves, the revolution over and the slate clean, in a position
to enter upon and fully enjoy their inheritance.
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Determined to do this not only for the time being but
for the future and having no stomach for the omni-compe-
tence of Parliaments, they set about to constitute their gov-
ernments so that those having special and partial interests,
and desiring to substitute their private interests for the
justice of the common good, could not unite to obtain con-
trol and pass unjust laws, that is, laws violative of the nat-
ural law principles on which their governments had been
founded and their constitutions adopted to maintain.
It was not a new idea to them that the legislative
should not, indeed could not, enact laws which ran counter
to what were then regarded as the natural rights of man.
They knew that in their last analysis all governments rest
on force and that the great end of justice is to substitute
the notion of right for that of violence and to place a legal
barrier between the power of the government and the use
of physical force.
When, therefore, our forebears, in breaking off from
England and in forming a government of their own, wrote
and spoke of the "laws of nature and of nature's God"
and of the natural rights of man, they were not dealing
with theoretical abstractions. They were dealing with the
realities, with words become flesh and dwelling among men.
They knew from their reading and from their own exper-
ience with unjust governments and governors the nature
of governments and of men. They knew they had not
bought liberty in fee simple absolute for a price paid down
in full, that they had only made a down payment on it and
that eternal vigilance was the price they and their posterity
must be forever paying.
Knowing that it was the nature of men to learn but to
forget, to learn and forget again, they took the greatest
pains in the Declaration of Independence, in the consti-
tutions and bills of rights, federal and state, and in the
Federalist Papers, to tell us so. In these documents of eter-
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nal significance and verity, to those of us who as real in-
heritors revere and cherish our heritage, they wrote down
at once their understanding and distrust of the nature of
governments and governors, and their abiding faith in
natural law and the natural rights of man. Written down
at a time when men really believed that "Men who their
duties know, but know their rights, and knowing, dare
maintain, these constitute a state," " they were testaments
to that faith. They were written down by men who thought
in first principles, whose minds were steeped in the notions
of natural law and the rights of man, the dominant politi-
cal philosophy of their day. Their hearts were lifted up
with the vision of a new freedom on a new earth, and who
believed, with the philosophers, in the perfectibility of man,
and with them, that the human species was capable of an
unbounded improvement.
Yearning toward posterity, the founders greatly desired
that theirs would some day reach the delectable mountains,
from whence they could see the Heavenly City of a perfect
and equal justice far shining and some day later even pass
over the sacred river to rest under the shade of the trees.
But they were not philosophers, and they spent little
time in dreaming. Intensely practical, they believed with
Priestley-though like him they believed in a limited gov-
ernment-that "government being the great instrument
of this progress, that form of government will have a just
claim to our approbation which favors this progress, and
that must be condemned in which it is retarded." 36
Many of them were lawyers; all were law-minded. Burke's
astrophe to the American Colonists, in his Speech on Con-
ciliation,37 was known to them all. They knew that:
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of
government, and that it is equally undeniable that whenever
35 HUTCHESON, LAW AS LIBERATOR 5 (1937).
36 Ibid.
37 Edmund Burke, as quoted id. at 6.
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and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some
of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers.
They knew with Montesquieu that the corruption of any
form of government generally begins with the corruption
of its principle, and they knew that if the spirit of the laws
-that government was made for man, not man for govern-
ment-failed, then also would fail the law. They knew that
the nature and principle of each government had a strong
influence on its laws and that if they could but establish
and maintain the government on natural law principles,
the laws would appear to flow thence as from their source.
They believed with Rousseau, that "It is to law alone that
men owe justice and liberty. It is this salutary organ of the
will of all which establishes in civil rights, the natural e-
quality between men."38 They knew with him, too, that
"Obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is
liberty," 11 and that "the passage from the state of nature
to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man,
by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giv-
ing his actions a basis they formerly lacked." 40
They particularly adopted as their own Rousseau's
doctrine that: 41
Apart from the primitive contract, the vote of the majority
always binds all the rest. This follows from the contract it-
self. . . This presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of
the general will still reside in the majority; when they cease to
do so, whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer pos-
sible. [Emphasis supplied.]
They agreed with him, too, that it would be entirely: 42
... possible for the Council of a Democracy to pass unjust
decrees and condemn the innocent; but this never happens
unless the people is seduced by private interests, which the
credit or eloquence of some clever persons substitutes for those
38 RoussEAu, THE SOcIAL CONTRAcT AND DiscoURSES ON POLI cAL ECONOMY
256-7 (Everyman's Library ed.).
39 As quoted in HuTc £SoN, LAW AS LIBERATOR 83 (1937).
40 Id. at 84.
41 Id. at 83n.
42 Id at 101.
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of the state; in which case the general will will be one thing,
and the result of public deliberation another. [Emphasis sup-
plied.]
When they drew up their written constitutions, their
written consent and will to be governed, they took the great-
est pains to provide against this happening by limiting
governmental powers and by marking out freedom areas,
areas of individual conduct and action, into which state
power could not enter to forbid or to command.
It was accepted as axiomatic with them that "all men
desire in this world a happy life," " and that a happy life
meant one in which by diligence, enterprise, and oppor-
tunity, each could advance his fortunes and secure the
feelings of independence and of security which ownership
sufficient for his present needs, with some provision for
his future, always gives to man. Nobody then denied that
the right to acquire and own property was a natural right
which governments must preserve and protect; no one
could be found who believed differently, and if any had
been found, he would have been dismissed as a fool or a
knave.
They knew that life and liberty alone could not give
happiness; that a man would be no better than a slave
if he could not exercise his natural right to acquire and
own property and to retain it free from arbitrary control;
and that a government which did not recognize and pre-
serve this right could not be just. Locke, by whom they
were greatly influenced, had put it this way: "
The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into
commonwealths and putting themselves under government,
is the preservation of their property; to which, in the state of
nature, there are many things wanting.
For the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them
when they endeavor to invade the property of the subject, and
43 Id. at 179.
44 Ibid.
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to make themselves, or any part of the community, master or
arbitrary disposer of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the
people.
The reason why men enter into society is the preservation
of their property; and the end while [why] they choose and
authorize a legislative is that there may be laws made, and
rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the so-
ciety, to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every
part and member of the society.
Thirdly, the supreme power cannot take from any man any
part of his property without his own consent for the preserva-
tion of property is the end of government, and that for which
men enter into society.
Rousseau, strong contender though he was for the author-
ity of society and the sovereignty of the general will, as long
as, but only while, the general will remains just-that is,
acts in accordance with the principles of natural law-pro-
ponent and advocate though he was of the view that a so-
ciety organized on natural law principles should, in accord-
ance with those principles, have full and adequate power
over its members, including their lives and their property, is
yet one of the strongest advocates of natural rights,4" in-
cluding particularly the right of the individual man to ac-
quire and own property. He declared, as vigorously as
45 "He [Rousseau] was concerned with establishing government on a basis
compatible with the freedom of man and with his dignity as a rational being.
Natural man and natural order were for him not historical facts, belonging to a
dim past, but eternal norms which alone were able to guide the peoples wishing
to replace the shaky and arbitrary foundations of government by force with the
Permanent and lasting ones of a rational society of free men. Thus alone the
paradox could be overcome that man was born free, and everywhere was in chains.
Since force does not create right nor establish a legitimate power, and since so-
ciety must exist and man can live only within it, a way must be found for him
to will society out of his own free will, and obey laws because he has prescribed
them for himself.
"In this new contractual society in which the People are sovereign, inalienable
individual rights are not abolished, but made secure in a state based not on arbi-
trariness and force but on the moral law.' Komw, Tim IDEA o NArO-uSm
240-1 (1944).
"Rousseau's importance for and influence on the development of modem po-
litical thought could hardly be exaggerated. . . ." Id. at 237.
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Locke did, that the protection of private property is the end
of government. In his Discourse on Political Economy, he
said: 4
It would be still worse.. . if their lives, liberties, and prop-
perties lay at the mercy of persons in power without-it being
possible for them to get relief from the laws.
It is certain that the right of property is the most sacred
of all the rights of citizenship, and even more important, in
some respects, than liberty itself; ... or finally, because prop-
erty is the true foundation of civil society, and the real guar-
antee of the undertakings of citizens....
Montesquieu declared it to be the duty of the laws to
see that rights in property given by the civil law should be
invariably preserved; that it would never be to the public
good to deprive an individual of his property. Bentham,
the utilitarian, the active apostle of the greatest happiness
principle, the moderate positivist, was a firm and active be-
liever in the general beneficence of laws which secure men
in the possession of their property. He maintained that the
great virtue of law was "to give men that strong and per-
manent expectation that they could hold what was theirs." 41
Said he: 4"
But perhaps it may be alleged that the laws of property
are good for those who have property and oppressive to those
who have none. The poor man, perhaps, is more miserable
than he would be without laws.
Not so. The laws in creating property have created riches
only in relation to poverty. Poverty is not the work of laws;
it is the primitive condition of the human race.
Conclusion
A word or two about the confusion of thought which
makes some propound as irrepressible and irreconcilable
here a conflict between natural rights and social rights, be-
46 Rousseau, op. cit. supra note 38, at 271.
47 As quoted in Huca-EsoN, LAw As LIBEaATOR 181 (1937).
48 Ibid.
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tween property rights and human rights, or, as some put
it, between democracy and property,49 and I am done.
There is, there always will be, until perfect justice comes,
a conflict between the justice and the injustice of opposing
claims upon and to property asserted by government acting
for and through the majorities which have the power and
by private owners acting for themselves. There certainly
is a complete, an irreconcilable, opposition between state
socialism 50 of any kind and the natural right to acquire and
own property, the same complete and irreconciliable opposi-
tion that there is between those forms of government and
the form which we enjoy.
There certainly is not, there cannot be, if terms are prop-
erly defined and used, any conflict, any antagonism be-
tween property and the limited constitutional government
we enjoy, any between human rights and rights in property,
as we know them here. All rights are and must be human.
A fundamental tenet of a liberal, limited constitutional de-
mocracy-the only kind we know-is the right of free men
to a reasonable approximation to equality, not of ability,
but of opportunity to acquire, to own, and to hold property,
and not to be deprived of it except by due process of law.
There is not, there cannot be, therefore, any opposition be-
tween property and the limited constitutional democracy
we have, or between the ownership of property and the prin-
ciple of democracy.
49 See id. at 175 et seq.
50 "Call it what you will, Fascism, Naziism, Communism, every totalitarian
movement has meant and still means the destruction of a government of checks
and balances, even of the possibility of the evolution of such a government. It
has meant the establishment of government by decree, by bureaucratic planning,
by concentrated and irresponsible power. It has meant the regimentation of
peoples by means of the expropriation not only of natural resources but also of
employing capital, and the eventual taking over of the ownership of the total
wealth of the nation by a class of professional politicians. In the end, it has meant
the loss of freedom, in any sense that Americans understand the word-not only
free enterprise but also free speech, free elections, free press, and every other
freedom as well." Sproul, in an address, May 31, 1948.
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The theory of such a democracy requires the mutual rec-
ognition that the individual has no rights in his property
which are in conflict with the justice of the general will,
that justice which is seated in natural law and prescribed in
the constitution; and that the government has no rights
and the individual no duties and obligations in respect of his
property except in aid of and measured by that justice. In
a society like ours, the discovery, in a controversy between
them, whether the claim of the individual or that of the
government is in accord with that justice, completely and
at once determines the issue.
Discussions then in terms of conflicts between property
and democracy, between human rights and property rights
are foolish and misleading. They should be restated as
conflicts between the owners of private property and the
government over the extent and the manner of the exercise
in a particular case of public control over it. This latter con-
flict is by no means inevitable. It arises only where unjust
claims are put forward on either side.
In October, 1820, when this country had stood and with-
stood for thirty years. Thomas Jefferson, with that pride
and devotion to his country and its institutions which mark-
ed him as the foremost apostle of Americanism, wrote to
Richard Rush: 51
We exist and are quoted as standing proofs that a govern-
ment so modeled as to rest continuously on the will of the
whole society, is a practicable government. Were we to break
to pieces, it would damp the hopes and efforts of the good, and
give triumph to those of the bad through the whole enslaved
world. As members therefore, of the universal society of
mankind, and standing high in responsible relation with them,
it is our sacred duty to suppress passion among ourselves,
and not to blast the confidence we have inspired of proof that
a government of reason is better than one of force.
In bringing to a close this appeal for the preservation from
corruption of the natural law principles on which this gov-
51 As quoted in 3 RANDALL, LiFE OF THowAs JFxPERsoN 458 (1858).
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ernment was formed, may I not commend these views to
all men of good will who believe in our country and its in-
stitutions and, believing, work and pray earnestly without
ceasing that its principle be preserved from corruption. May
I not too in that spirit and in all humility, in these dark and
troubled, times, urge upon us all natural law men and posi-
tivists alike, in Jefferson's phrase "suppressing passion
among ourselves" to strive earnestly and in good faith, to
understand, to minimize, and, if possible, to reconcile our
points of difference, and to magnify and, if possible, enlarge
our points of agreement. If we can do this, we will not "blast
the confidence we have inspired of proof that a government
of reason is better than a government of force." 52 On the
contrary, we will justify and increase it.
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